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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks form
a serious threat to the security of Internet services. However,
despite over a decade of research, and the existence of several
proposals to address this problem, there has been little progress
to date on actual adoption. We present Mirage, a protocol that
achieves comparable performance to other DDoS mitigation
schemes while providing benefits when deployed only in the
server’s local network and its upstream ISP, where local business
objectives may incentivize deployment. Mirage does not require
source end hosts to install any software to access Mirage
protected websites.
Our approach is that end hosts can thwart the attackers
by employing the principle of a moving target: end hosts in
our architecture periodically change IP addresses to keep the
attackers guessing. Knowledge of an active IP address of the
destination end host can act as an implicit authorization to send
data. We evaluate Mirage using theoretical analysis, simulations
and a prototype implementation on PlanetLab. We find that our
design provides a first step towards a deployable, yet effective
DDoS defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of service (DoS) attacks form a serious threat to
the security of Internet services. In a DoS attack, a single
computer or a group of computers (DDoS) flood the victim’s
machine by sending a large number of packets, exhausting
its bandwidth capacity (or software processing capabilities).
This causes legitimate traffic to back off, resulting in denial
of service to properly behaving hosts. The frailty of today’s
Internet to DDoS attacks is evident by recent attacks on
entire countries such as Georgia and Estonia, whistle-blowing
websites such as Wikileaks, financial transaction hubs such
as Mastercard, Visa, and PayPal, intelligence agencies such
as CIA, government organizations such as US department of
justice, and online election servers [18], [47], [51].
There are two main schools of thought regarding DDoS
defense. Filtering-based approaches [10], [32], [34] first
aim to detect and classify the malicious traffic and then
install filters at the network layer to prevent the malicious
traffic from exhausting victim’s resources. On the other hand,
Capability-based approaches [38], [52], [53] aim to send only
authorized traffic to hosts in the Internet. Extensive academic
work has been done on these approaches, and their tradeoffs
are well understood [32]. However, despite over a decade
of research, little progress has been made on real-world
deployment. In fact, the number of DDoS attacks increased
by 57% in 2011 [30]. A fundamental obstacle to deployment
is that a deploying AS does not benefit until other ASes also
participate in the scheme. This dependency between ASes is
a chicken-and-egg problem for deployment in the Internet,
which traditionally does not force a protocol to be deployed.
Phalanx [17] aims to reduce the number of ASes that are
required to deploy the protocol for effective defense, but does
not completely solve the chicken-and-egg problem (see § II).
In this paper, we propose Mirage, a DDoS defense mech-
anism that aims to remove the required deployment at other
ASes as much as possible. Towards this end, we adopt
an approach similar to frequency hopping in wireless net-
works [5]: in Mirage, a destination end host varies its IP
addresses according to a pseudorandom sequence known only
to authorized hosts. Knowledge of an active IP address owned
by the destination end host acts as an implicit authorization
to send data, and enables Mirage to reduce the required
deployment of other ASes. To realize this idea in a concrete
system, we leverage known ideas: computational puzzle [21],
[49], [50], filtering and fair queueing. Our key contribution is
a system architecture that integrates these existing primitives
with the novel paradigm of IP address hopping, with the goal
of reducing the need for deployment across organizational
boundaries. The security of Mirage depends on the space of
IP addresses that a destination end host can use. To get a suf-
ficiently large space of IP addresses, each Mirage-protected
server uses its IPv6 prefix and chooses interface addresses
as these secret addresses. The practicality of Mirage will
grow each day with the increasing deployment of IPv6 and
the ability of IPv4-only-connected hosts to use IPv6 through
tunneling, as described in § III-A. Randomly hopping IP
addresses play the same role as capabilities in capability-
based schemes, which in contrast to Mirage, introduce a
completely new packet header [38], [52], [53]. It is much
more likely that IPv6 will witness widespread deployment,
as opposed to a new custom Internet header.
We evaluate Mirage using theoretical analysis, large-scale
simulations and a prototype implementation on PlanetLab.
We find that Mirage is able to provide honest nodes with
their fair share of system resources, comparable to previous
DDoS mitigation mechanisms. At the same time, Mirage
is able to provide some benefits to a server when only
the server’s local network and its upstream ISP deploy it.
Unlike previous proposals, Mirage only requires functionality
from routers that is already deployed in today’s routers,
though this functionality may need to be scaled depending
on the point of deployment. In particular, Mirage does not
require router hardware or software modifications to support
new headers/fields in network packets, and achieves this
without changing the semantics of existing header fields.
Our architecture also does not require any cryptography at
the routers. Finally, source end hosts can take advantage of
Mirage-protected sites without installing any software. We
find that our design provides a first step towards a deployable,
yet effective DDoS defense.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to two main schools of thought about
DDoS mitigation: filtering and capability-based designs.
Filtering and rate limiting: Pushback [34] defends against
DDoS attacks by having congested routers rate limit the set
of flows responsible for congestion (aggregate rate limiting).
If local rate limiting is not sufficient to mitigate conges-
tion/DDoS attacks, then the router contacts its upstream
router and asks it to perform rate limiting as well. AITF [10]
is a traffic filtering architecture that leverages record routing
techniques to enable a victim to identify routers close to a
source. The victim can then install filters close to the source
of attack traffic. StopIt [32] proposes a filtering mechanism
whereby a receiver can request a particular flow to be blocked
for a period of time. While filtering-based schemes are pow-
erful, they face significant practical hurdles, as they assume
the ability to differentiate attack traffic from legitimate traffic.
Adversaries may make use of cover traffic to hide their
communication, or may mimic legitimate traffic (e.g., by
mimicking legitimate GET requests). Mirage does not make
any assumptions about the ability to classify malicious traffic;
however, if a method to differentiate attack traffic is available,
Mirage can leverage it to provide a significant subset of the
requisite filtering capability.
Capabilities: Capability-based schemes provide the receiver
an ability to directly control its reachability within the net-
work. When a sender wants to transmit packets to a receiver,
the receiver decides whether to permit it and lets routers
know its decision. Then, the router allows the corresponding
packets to pass. SIFF [52] gives a technique to efficiently
allow receivers to authorize senders to transmit. A router
sends tokens to a receiver that can be used to authorize
sender requests. When a receiver wants to receive packets
from the sender, the receiver passes the token to a sender. The
sender adds the token to packet headers it transmits to get a
preferential service from the router. TVA [53] refines SIFF
to defend against brute-force attacks to improve practicality
and efficiency. Portcullis [38] addresses a vulnerability in
both SIFF and TVA where an attacker could launch a denial
of capability attack, and prevent the initial request packets
of honest users from reaching the victim. Portcullis makes
use of computational puzzles to force requesting users to
perform work before being able to access the initial request
channel. In § VIII, we discuss the deployment challenges
for capability-based schemes, including the problem of low
benefit for early adopters, the need to upgrade client end-
host software, requiring new router primitives such as cryp-
tographic support, as well as requiring a new custom Internet
header. Additionally, we note that in most of the above
approaches, the capability to send a packet is specific to
the path used to route a packet to a destination. Thus, route
changes in the Internet pose a significant challenge for these
approaches. In contrast, Mirage uses the knowledge of an
active destination IP address within the IP address range of
the destination end host as an implicit authorization to send
data. Such an authorization mechanism is end-to-end, and is
not affected by route changes in the Internet.
Other approaches: Phalanx [17] proposes to use a swarm,
a large pool of geographically and topologically distributed
well provisioned machines to absorb the DDoS attack, and
forward legitimate traffic to the victim. Once a few ASes de-
ploy an adequate number of such well provisioned machines
to form an overlay network, any ISP can gain immediate
benefit from deploying Phalanx. While the design of Phalanx
is a significant improvement over prior work in this domain, it
still requires other ASes to deploy the protocol and participate
in an overlay network. Wang et al. [49], [50] have also
proposed the use of client puzzles, but their approach does
not focus on deployment. NetFence [33] proposes to use the
network as the first line of defense to mitigate DDoS attacks,
but assumes that IP spoofing is not possible. Speak-up [48]
uses proof of work techniques for DDoS defense, but its focus
is on application-layer attacks. Similarly, the end-to-end
approach of Gligor [20] is also limited to application-layer
attacks. Kandula et al. [29], and Morein et al. [35] propose
defense mechanisms wherein users solve CAPTCHAs [6] to
differentiate themselves from bots. Mirage does not require
users to solve CAPTCHAs. Keromytis et al. [31] propose
an approach where only select nodes in an overlay network
are allowed to communicate with a destination, and their
IP addresses are kept hidden. Pre-authorized users are given
knowledge of a subset of those select nodes, and can use them
as a proxy to communicate with a destination. Mirage builds
upon the idea of hiding proxy IP addresses by introducing
the notion of destination IP address hopping. Mirage does not
require the use of proxies or overlay networks, and provides
service to all users (not just pre-authorized users). Similar to
Mirage, Stavrou et al. [43] also propose the use of spread-
spectrum techniques, but they rely on an external overlay
network, and do not focus on the issue of deployment.
Moving target defenses: Mirage is inspired from frequency
hopping in wireless networks, and more generally, it is related
to the concept of moving target defenses [28] which aim to
create uncertainty for the adversary. Mirage’s notion of IP
address hopping is related to the concept of address space
randomization techniques such as ALSR [41], which aims
to defend against untrusted code, and NASR [9], which
aims to defend against hit-list worms, and the work of Shue
et al. [42], which aims to implement network capabilities.
The key challenges in the application of address space
randomization techniques for DDoS defense are to (a) enable
(any) legitimate client to access the server, (b) constrain the
effects of malicious clients, and (c) defend against attacks on
upstream network prefixes. Mirage solves these challenges,
with the additional goal of reducing the need for deployment
across organizational boundaries. In contrast, both NASR and
the work of Shue et al. are vulnerable to malicious clients
that query DNS servers to learn victim server’s address;
unlike Mirage, they lack proof-of-work mechanisms such
as computational puzzles to limit attackers. Moreover, both
honest and malicious clients are issued identical addresses
for the victim server, enabling malicious clients to dominate
victim’s network resources. Finally, both NASR and Shue et
al. do not defend against DDoS attacks on victim’s upstream
network prefixes, for example, an adversary can flood an IP
address that was previously in use by the victim.
III. MIRAGE OVERVIEW
We next describe some goals and limitations of our work
(§ III-A), and explain how we design Mirage to achieve these
goals (§ III-B).
A. Design Goals and Limitations
1. Incremental and incentivized deployment: We target
an incrementally deployable design where a small number of
routers should be able to deploy Mirage and bring immediate
benefit to downstream servers. We note that in such a design,
local business objectives may incentivize deployment. Our
architecture should not interfere with operation of existing
or non-upgraded network protocols or systems. Mechanisms
that introduce additional packet headers or protocol layers
may not satisfy this property. For instance, schemes that
introduce additional headers can face significant challenges
during incremental deployment, due to incompatibilities with
scrubbing and IDS services, layer-7 and layer-4 load balanc-
ing, and other middleboxes and network services that inspect
non-IP layers of the network stack.
2. Lowering deployment cost: We target a design which
minimizes the requirement for cooperation across adminis-
trative or trust boundaries, and does not rely on an external
overlay network to deploy the mechanism. Mechanisms that
require the use of trusted hardware [8], or require end
users to upgrade software face major deployment hurdles
and are incompatible with our design goals. Similarly, we
avoid reliance on new primitives from routers, such as router
cryptography and additional packet headers, which require
significant support from vendors and increase the cost of
network equipment.
3. Network fairness: In the absence of techniques to classify
attack traffic, we aim to provide each user with its fair share
of the network. However, if techniques to partially classify
attack traffic are available, then Mirage can leverage them.
4. Low overhead: We target a design that does not impose
additional cost on the network or end hosts when the system
is not under attack (adaptive defense).
Limitations: Our work has several limitations. First, like
other schemes that use puzzles, such as Portcullis [38] and
Phalanx [17], Mirage requires the ability to distribute crypto-
graphic information (puzzles) in a manner that is not subject
to DDoS. Mirage can use existing replicated services such as
Akamai or well provisioned cloud services such as Amazon
S3 or even DNS. Second, Mirage requires a large IP address
space to perform effectively. To achieve this, Mirage can
make use of IPv6. The Internet is already in a transition phase
to IPv6 [3], and we note that IANA has already exhausted its
pool of IPv4 allocation blocks in February 2011 [2]. Mirage
is able to accommodate scenarios where source end hosts are
in an IPv4 only network, by the use IPv4-IPv6 translators.
For example, Teredo IPv6 tunneling [44] is already built
into Windows. Mirage can even protect destination end-hosts
serviced by an IPv4 network; in such scenarios, the victim
sets up a tunnel to a IPv6 provider that supports Mirage. To
protect against native IPv4 DDoS, the victim either keeps its
IPv4 address secret, or requests its ISP to block any traffic
that does not originate from the tunnel server. We emphasize
that in contrast to Mirage’s approach of leveraging IPv6,
prior work on capability advocates a completely new packet
header.
Third, our design requires loose time synchronization, on
the order of tens of seconds. To address this, Mirage may
require external systems such as NTP, which can provide time
synchronization with accuracies on the order of hundreds of
milliseconds on wide area networks [24]. Fourth, Mirage tar-
gets per computation fairness. If the ratio of honest sources’
computational power to the total computational power of all
nodes (honest nodes and attacker nodes) is r, then Mirage
provides the honest nodes with a fraction r of the bottleneck
link bandwidth. In scenarios where there is a mismatch
between the computational resources of the attacker and the
honest nodes (for example, a webserver with a small user
base being attacked by a very large botnet), the fair share of
the honest nodes will be small.1 We note that this limitation
is also shared by other state of the art mechanisms that
rely on computational puzzles, such as Portcullis [38] and
Phalanx [17]. Another aspect related to the issue of resource
mismatch is the differences in computational capabilities
of various devices, such as a smartphone and a GPU.
However, Mirage is compatible with the use of memory-
bound puzzles [4], which have been shown to lower resource
disparity between devices.
Threat model: There are two types of DoS attacks:
(a) network-layer attacks, where an attacker attempts to
overwhelm the transmission capabilities of the underlying
1Even though the fair share of honest nodes may be small in some
scenarios, their requests will still succeed.
network, and (b) application-layer attacks, where the attacker
attempts to overwhelm processing capabilities of the victim’s
application software. While the focus of this paper is on
network-layer DoS attacks, Mirage provides an interface
to the application layer to fair queue incoming requests
based on proof of work (destination IP addresses). Similar
to Portcullis [38] and Phalanx [17], we assume that lookup
services such as DNS can be highly replicated (since they
serve short, static content), and are not subject to DDoS. We
assume the adversary may have access to a large number of
hosts (e.g., via ownership of a botnet), and may perform IP
spoofing. We assume routers can be compromised, though
we note that a compromised router can always block traffic
towards the victim.
B. System architecture
IP address hopping: To mitigate denial of service attacks,
we need some way to make it harder for the attacker to reach
the server. In previous approaches, capabilities or randomly
chosen proxies (Phalanx [17]) are used for that purpose.
However, these approaches add a new packet header and
require deployment in other ASes thereby hindering incen-
tivized deployment. Mirage’s approach is to use randomly
changing destination IP addresses. This idea enables Mirage
to avoid the necessity of other ASes’ deployment. Mirage
consists of a set of add-ons to existing Internet services
(Figure 1) that enable a server to dynamically hop (change)
its IP address. In particular, the server is assigned a set of
IP addresses, and repeatedly modulates the address it uses
from this set via a deterministic pseudorandom function. This
function computes the server’s current IP address given the
current time as input. The server can then share that pseu-
dorandom function with authenticated clients; these clients
can then determine the IP address used by the server by
computing the pseudorandom function.
Slowing the attacker with computation-limited hopping func-
tions: While certain Internet services can authenticate clients
(e.g., systems that use CAPTCHAS or require the user to sign
in with a secret password), other services may be unable to
distinguish valid user requests from malicious requests. To
support these services, a form of fair sharing mechanism is
necessary. Options for fair sharing include bandwidth-based
fairness [48] or computation-based fairness [38]. We do not
use bandwidth-based fairness since it may induce congestion
collapse in network. Mirage makes it more computationally
difficult for the client to retrieve the IP address using the
pseudorandom function. This is done by having the server
construct a computationally-harder version of the pseudo-
random function, which is then handed out to clients. This
computationally-harder version is constructed by incorporat-
ing a cryptographic puzzle into the pseudorandom function
returned to the client. Mirage makes use of hard-to-DoS
infrastructures such as Akamai, DNS or well provisioned
cloud services such as Amazon S3 for puzzle distribution. It
Fig. 1. Mirage network architecture
is important to note that putting all servers to cloud services
to defend against DDoS attacks is expensive. Mirage uses
such service for only puzzle distribution.
Avoiding network bottlenecks with in-network filtering: Even
though a server can perform IP address hopping, an adversary
can still attack the server by sending traffic to any of the
alternate IP addresses assigned to the server, even though
they are not in use. To address this, Mirage requires routers
to perform in-network filtering. In particular, the victim host
may instruct upstream routers of IP address ranges that it
is currently not using. This may be done by a variety of
mechanisms. For simplicity, our design assumes that the end
host explicitly publishes access control lists that are serviced
by upstream routers. Ideally, this filtering should be done
near bottleneck links.
Isolating the attacker with address sets: Hopping IP ad-
dresses to evade the attacker only works when the attacker
does not know the new IP address of the server. However,
preventing the attacker from knowing an active IP address of
the victim seems difficult, while still enabling non-malicious
clients to know the current IP address. Hence, Mirage instead
attempts to constrain the effects of malicious clients by
associating a set of active IP addresses with the server, and
and returning different elements of that set to different clients.
To achieve this, we leverage standard techniques (such as
those used by DNS [7]) to return different IP addresses
to different clients based on their topological location. To
defend against attacks where a single malicious client solves
a computational puzzle and shares the puzzle solution with
its colluding attackers, we need to provide isolation across
elements of the set. To do this, the server or the bottleneck
link can utilize fair queuing.
An example of the Mirage protocol is shown in Figure 1:
(1) First, the server determines a seed for a globally-known
pseudorandom function, and registers it with its puzzle server.
(2) The server then begins using that pseudorandom function
to compute its currently active set of IP addresses. This
function is periodically recomputed to perform the hopping.
(3) When a host wishes to make a request, it does a DNS
lookup for the victim, gets redirected to the puzzle server, and
retrieves the computational puzzle. The user then executes the
puzzle to determine the server’s current IP address. The user
then sends packets to the server. The user periodically re-
executes the puzzle to keep track of the server’s current IP
address. (4) When a malicious host, such as a bot, wishes to
execute a request, it follows exactly the same procedure. Due
to the puzzles, the botnet cannot acquire more IP addresses
than its computational power. Finally, the network filters
traffic that does not have a victim server’s current IP address.
Due to the per-destination fair queuing, bandwidth is shared
fairly across the destination IP addresses, reducing power of
an attacker.
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the basic Mirage design. In
particular, we describe the higher level functions performed
by destination end hosts, network routers, puzzle servers, and
source end hosts. We discuss security/performance improve-
ments, as well as deployment details of our protocol in § V.
A. Destination end hosts
IP address hopping: Our core mechanism is inspired by
frequency hopping, used in wireless networks. Frequency
hopping is a way to transmit radio signals by rapidly switch-
ing the carrier through a pseudorandom sequence of channels.
If a receiver knows the pseudorandom sequence (e.g., if it
shares a key with the sender), it can listen on the same
sequence of frequencies to receive the transmission. Doing
this can make wireless devices less susceptible to “jamming”
attacks, which attempt to deny service by transmitting unde-
sired traffic on a communication channel.
In our work, we apply this idea to make end hosts
less susceptible to denial of service attacks. In particular,
end hosts are assigned a consecutive range (prefix) of IP
addresses. The sender and receiver then periodically hop
through a pseudorandom sequence of IP addresses when
communicating. We assume IPv6, to improve feasibility of
allocating multiple IP addresses to end hosts, given IPv6’s
larger address space (IPv6 addresses are 128 bits, with 64
bit subnet/interface addresses). 2 More generally, instead of
having a single active IP address, end hosts can choose to
have a set of active IP addresses from amongst their allocated
range. This set of active IP addresses will periodically
change. Each end host performs IP address hopping using
a local cryptographic master key. At any instance of time,
the master key can be used to determine the set of active IP
addresses for that end host:
IP (i) = PREFIX ||H(ENCKEY (i||TIME))
where IP (i) denotes the end host’s i’th active IP address,
PREFIX is the prefix IP address associated with the
end host, || represents the concatenation operation, H is a
2Mirage permits the same number of IPv6 devices as in the current IPv6
deployment model, where devices are assigned a unique 64-bit interface
address (RFCs 3513 and 4291 [22], [23]).
cryptographically secure hash function with output length
128− |PREFIX | bits, and ENCKEY (x) is the encryption
of x with the key KEY . This set of active IP addresses is
kept a secret, and will only be used under a DDoS attack.
In addition to this secret set of IP addresses (which keep
changing), the end hosts also maintain a static (not hopped)
IP address, which is used when the host is not under attack.
Puzzle server redirection: As in the current Internet
architecture, destination end hosts set up a DNS entry for
their hostname. Under a DDoS attack, a destination end
host (victim server) re-registers with its authoritative DNS
(ADNS) to point its record to the puzzle server, using similar
techniques to those used in CDNs for redirection and load
balancing (e.g., small TTL). From that point onwards, the
source end hosts are redirected to the puzzle servers.
Filtering requests to routers: Under a DDoS attack, the
victim communicates the current set of active IP addresses
to its upstream ASes. The upstream ASes can then block
incoming traffic to any of the remaining IP addresses which
are not in the active set. Thus, knowledge of any active IP
address can be used as an implicit authorization to send data
to that destination end host.
Leveraging attack traffic identification: Note that in the
absence of the ability to identify attack traffic, Mirage aims to
provide per computational fairness to clients. However, if it
is possible to identify attack traffic, then Mirage can leverage
this ability to improve performance for honest clients. In
particular, the victim server can stop using the destination
IP addresses corresponding to attack traffic, and request the
upstream ASes to filter those IP addresses.
B. Routers
Filtering traffic with existing router interfaces: Whenever
a victim is under a DDoS attack, the upstream routers receive
information about the set of active IP addresses currently in
use by the victim. The upstream routers can then filter out
incoming traffic to all remaining (non-active) IP addresses (as
well as other IP addresses that are identified by the victim
as being associated with attack traffic). Note that the victim
can start by installing filters at its edge router, and continue
this process at the routers further upstream until its link is no
longer congested. In § V we show that the upstream ASes can
perform such filtering using existing router interfaces such as
access control lists (ACLs) configured via iBGP feeds from
IRSCP [46] style management servers. Moreover, in § VII,
we show that performing such filtering only at the server’s
upstream provider is sufficient to block most attacks.
Per-destination fair queueing: After filtering out packets
with non-active destination IP addresses, the upstream routers
perform fair queueing per destination. This results in per
destination address fair allocation of resources when attack
traffic cannot be distinguished from legitimate traffic. We
note that routers already support fair queueing as an option,
Fig. 2. Puzzle construction: active IP address of the server is the solution.
easily enabled via configuration changes. We discuss this in
more detail in § V.
C. Puzzle Servers
Under attack, source end hosts are redirected to a puzzle
server.
Active IP address generation: The puzzle server shares a
cryptographic key with the destination end host. The puzzle
server can use the end host’s cryptographic key to derive a
set of the end host’s active IP addresses at any instance of
time (as discussed in § IV-A).
Computational puzzles: When a source end host first
contacts the puzzle server, it responds with a computational
puzzle. Upon receiving a solution to the computational
puzzle from the requesting node, the server sends back an
ephemeral active IP address of the destination end host. We
use Portcullis [38] to implement the computational puzzles
aspect.
D. Source end hosts
The source end hosts first contact the DNS server to re-
solve the hostname for the destination end host. If there is no
DDoS attack on the destination, they receive the conventional
static non-hopping IP address for the destination. On the
other hand, the source end hosts are redirected to a puzzle
server during a DDoS attack. The source end hosts then
contact the puzzle server to obtain an ephemeral active IP
address for the destination. The puzzle server first asks it
to solve a computational puzzle. The source end host solves
the computational puzzle and sends it to the puzzle server.
The puzzle server returns an ephemeral active IP address of
the destination, which can be used to receive service. Our
JavaScript mechanism in § V-B enables source end hosts to
access any Mirage protected web server without installing
any software.
V. DEPLOYMENT DETAILS
Next, we describe extensions to the basic Mirage design
that simplify deployment and enhance security/performance.
A. Puzzle Server
Eliminating puzzle verification: In the Mirage design
described so far, the puzzle server issues the computational
puzzle seed to the clients, verifies that the clients have
solved the puzzle correctly, and sends an active IP address
to the clients. We can simplify the complexity at the puzzle
servers by having the active IP addresses be the solution
to the computational puzzles. This way, the puzzle servers
act purely as computational puzzle seed generation and
distribution servers. Since IP addresses are puzzle solutions,
notice that the destination end-host must be able to efficiently
compute the puzzle solutions, since it would need to put the
results of the computational puzzle in the network ACLs. We
term this feature to be a trapdoor computational puzzle. We
now provide constructions for such a trapdoor puzzle. As
before, let us assume that the destination end host and the
puzzle server share a key. The destination end host and the
puzzle server can compute the set of active IP addresses as
before, i.e.,
IP (i) = PREFIX ||H(ENCKEY (i||TIME))
Let us denote the first 64 bits of the destination
end host’s IP address as the PREFIX . We denote
the last 64 bits of IP (i) as IPSUFFIX(i) (equal to
H(ENCKEY (i||TIME))). Let KEYi be a symmetric key.
Let R be a random number. Now, the puzzle server first
computes the following:
ENCKEYi(R||IPSUFFIX(i)) = CIPHERi
Next, the puzzle server issues the following to the client a)
the PREFIX , the r bit random number R, the cipher-text
of the encryption CIPHERi, all but the last d bits of KEYi,
where d is the difficulty level of the puzzle. The job of the
client is to iterate through each of the 2d possible values
of KEYi, decrypt the cipher-text CIPHERi, and check if
the first r bits of the decryption match the random number
R. Upon finding a match, the client can uncover a single
IP address by appending the last 64 bits of the decryption to
the PREFIX . Figure 2 illustrates this computational puzzle
design.
Honest but curious puzzle servers: We now extend Mirage
to use the puzzle servers as untrusted (honest but curious)
puzzle distribution servers. 3 The main idea is that the
destination end host can communicate the puzzles directly
to the puzzle server, so that puzzle server does not have
to generate the puzzle. Moreover, by using the previous
extension (§ V-A) where the active IP address is the solution
to the puzzle, the puzzle server does not need to do any
verification, eliminating the need for cryptography at the
3Active attacks by puzzle servers, such as returning incorrect JavaScript
to source end hosts, can be detected by the victim server (by anonymous
querying), and the malicious puzzle servers can be blacklisted.
puzzle server. The destination end host can simply chose a
random set of active IP addresses, generate the puzzles as in
the previous extension, and store them at the puzzle server.
In this fashion, the puzzle server does not need to be trusted
with the destination end host’s active IP addresses. Note that
a malicious puzzle server could share the puzzles with the
attackers ahead of time, enabling precomputation attacks. To
mitigate this attack, we propose that the destination end host
upload the puzzles at the puzzle server every hopping time
interval.
Eliminating puzzle server as a bottleneck: So far, we had
assumed that the adversary could not launch a DDoS attack
on the puzzle server. Since the puzzle servers simply need to
serve static puzzles and can be untrusted (due to above mech-
anisms), the destination end-host can ensure availability of
puzzle seeds by simple replication. For instance, the puzzles
could be hosted on Akamai or can be widely replicated across
cloud service providers such as Amazon S3. The adversary
would need to DDoS all of the replicas in order to DDoS
the destination. Note that different replicas could either store
different puzzles, or use standard CDN approaches to return
different puzzle objects to different source end hosts.
B. End-hosts
Legacy source end hosts: We now discuss how source
end hosts can take advantage of Mirage protected sites
without installing additional software. When the source end
host performs a DNS lookup for the destination end host,
it is redirected to a DoS-resistant puzzle server (can be
hosted by Akamai), which returns JavaScript code. 4 The
JavaScript solves the computational puzzle to obtain an active
IP address, and issues a cross origin request to that active
IP address, either using an iframe or a XMLHttpRequest.
The victim server can set Access-Control-Allow-Origin to
its own domain, to allow such a cross origin request from
the trusted JavaScript, and maintain functionality under the
constraints of the browsers same-origin policy (SOP). Sites
that disallow framing for defending against clickjacking can
set Frame-Options: Allow-From: to their own domain. To
enable subsequent requests from the client, the JavaScript can
set the base tag of relative reference links to the active IP
address. In this fashion, any standards compliant browser can
view a Mirage protected site. Clients that don’t use JavaScript
can be directed to a best effort service. The ability to access
Mirage protected websites without installing any software
makes our design most suitable for web applications.
Achieving per-computation fairness: We note that in the
protocol described in § IV, honest source end hosts only solve
4A small minority of users who visit the website in a short time window
both before and after attack may be affected by browser DNS caching [27].
We tested browser behavior for this scenario using Chrome/Firefox; we
found that the first browser request (after attack) is timed out (cached
IP address is unresponsive), but the subsequent reloads are successfully
redirected to the puzzle server.
a single computational puzzle per flow. This may not result
in per computation fairness, since the honest node’s com-
putational resources may be under-utilized. We mitigate this
problem as follows: when the honest source end hosts obtain
an active IP address for the destination end host (after solving
a computational puzzle), they continue to spend additional
computational resources, which can be used to derive new
active destination IP addresses (by querying for and solving
another puzzle). This modification in our protocol results in
per-computation fair allocation of resources. We now discuss
how source end hosts can load balance their traffic over all
available active IP addresses. To switch between available
active IP addresses, the JavaScript mechanism discussed
above could fetch each image or object in the page via a
different active IP address. For larger objects, the JavaScript
could make multiple requests for particular byte ranges of the
content (using HTTP range request header), and assemble the
returned contents to form the requested page.
Handling hopping interval transitions: In Mirage, we set
the hopping interval to 5 minutes, as discussed in § VI. A ma-
jority of web traffic flows in the Internet are short lived [12],
and will finish within a single hopping interval. For scenarios
where a short-lived flow starts close to the hopping point, and
for long lived flows, observe that the JavaScript is already
solving computational puzzles continuously, to achieve per
computation fairness. Based on our assumption of loose time
synchronization amongst end hosts, the JavaScript can start
to solve the puzzles for the next time period and thus receive
uninterrupted service. To prevent unnecessary loss in this
scenario, the destination continues to receive traffic on the
old set of IP addresses (from the previous hopping interval)
for a time threshold. Finally, we note that all cross origin
requests are made on IP addresses, and thus DNS caching
by browsers does not impede JavaScript’s ability to hop IP
addresses.
C. Network
Filtering traffic: The destination (victim) end host’s up-
stream routers need to filter traffic to all non-active IP
addresses for the victim. We propose two strategies for
filtering traffic, both of which use existing router interfaces.
The first strategy is to use an IRSCP [46]-like management
server within the destination’s upstream AS. The destination
end host could communicate its list of active IP addresses
to the management server, and the management server could
instruct routers to drop traffic to the remaining non-active
IP addresses via iBGP routing updates5. Alternatively, the
management server could push configuration files containing
ACLs for filtered IP addresses to routers. We now discuss
how big the ACL should be to support our protocol. Suppose
that the local network is under a DDoS attack, and that
5Note that iBGP routing updates are local to the AS and do not cause
routing instability.
network supports hundreds of thousands of users within the
time duration of the hopping interval (set to 5 minutes),
typical of large data center environments [15]. Also suppose
that we are interested in defending against a botnet with
100 000 bots. In this scenario, it suffices to install an ACL
with a few hundred thousand entries (estimated using prior
usage history) at the victim’s upstream ISP (assuming that
it is the bottleneck). Current routers can already support
millions of ACL entries [36], and would not need to be
upgraded in this scenario. On the other hand, to defend
against larger botnets, or when the deployment happens
further upstream, the ACL size could reach tens of millions of
entries, in which case existing filtering mechanisms may need
to be scaled (which the operator can do by installing more
memory at the router, rather than requiring cooperation from
the router vendor). We propose an adaptive version of Mirage
which can further reduce filter table size in Appendix IX.
Fair sharing: Routers already support per-destination fair
queueing, and this option can also be manipulated by a
configuration files pushed by a management device. For
example, the Cisco secure policy manager [13] can read in
high level description of policies for a network, and translate
them into low level specifications. When a destination end
host is under a DDoS attack, it can request its upstream
AS to enable per-destination fair queueing, who can then
automatically publish the corresponding configurations to
routers. Alternatively, if desired, the upstream AS could
eliminate the need for a policy manager device by leaving
fair queuing always enabled for the customer (some ISPs
already run similar QoS mechanisms to improve service
for their customers and their own traffic). Observe that the
state required to support per destination fair queueing at an
upstream router only depends on the number of flows towards
downstream destination IP addresses in a short time interval
(and not the total downstream IP address space). Finally, we
note that our design does not require perfect fair queueing.
Thus various traffic monitors located in the upstream AS
could check if some active IP addresses are receiving more
traffic than others, and if so, then push either a iBGP routing
update or an ACL update to block those active IP addresses.
Supporting IPv4: Mirage is ideally suited for IPv6, given
IPv6’s large address space. While implementing our architec-
ture in IPv4 has some challenges, it is feasible. We consider
multiple scenarios for IPv4. In the first scenario, the source
end host supports only IPv4, but the destination server and
its upstream provider (which is most likely to do filtering)
support IPv6. In this case, the source end hosts need to run an
IPv4-IPv6 translator, but the network continues to function as
before.We note that Teredo IPv6 tunneling [44] is built into
Windows and is available on Linux and Mac OS X. In the
second scenario, the source end host supports only IPv4 and
the destination end host’s network provider also supports only
IPv4. In this scenario, the destination end host can set up a
tunnel to another remote IPv6 provider. To prevent attackers
from targeting its IPv4 address, the destination end host can
request its local provider to filter all access to its IPv4 address
(except from its IPv6 tunnel). Now, the victim can advertise
its IPv6 address and perform IP address hopping as before.
As in the above scenario, source end hosts use an IPv4-
IPv6 translator, and the network does not need any software
or hardware updates. Alternatively, the victim server could
purchase service directly from an IPv6-enabled provider.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Next, we analytically evaluate the security of our design.
Network scanning attacks: A possible threat to Mirage
is the use of network scanning attacks to uncover the set
of active IP addresses in use by an end host. Due to the
large range of possible IP addresses for an end host (64 bits),
such attacks are already quite costly. The set of active IP
addresses changes after every hopping time interval (which
we set to 5 minutes); thus the attacker has to scan the entire
range within the hopping time interval. Consider two attack
scenarios: (a) the size of botnet owned by the attacker is
20, 000 (the average size of modern botnets [39]) and (b) the
size of the botnet is 1 million nodes (an extreme scenario).
Now, if the bots have 1Mbps links to their provider, each
bot would be able to send only about 225 ping packets over
the 5 minute interval. Thus, in the two attack scenarios, the
attacker would only be able to scan an insignificant fraction
of the range of IP addresses for an end host - 2−28 and 2−23
respectively.
Brute-force DoS attacks: The attacker could simply send
attack traffic to the victim using a random interface (subnet)
address for each packet, with the idea that a fraction of its
traffic would be able to bypass router filters and congest
the victim link. With perfect filtering of non-active IP ad-
dresses at the routers, such brute-force DoS attacks would
be completely ineffective as the probability of a random
IP address being an active IP address is very small. E.g.,
suppose there are about 5000 client nodes per 5 minute
interval per destination end host. Then, the set of active
IP addresses needed to contain about 25000 and 1, 005, 000
entries respectively (for the two attack scenarios discussed
above), resulting in the success rate of a random attack of
only 1.3 · 10−15 and 5.4 · 10−14 respectively.
Theoretical Results: Next, we present key analytical re-
sults which illustrate that (a) Mirage’s computational puzzle
mechanism is secure, (b) Mirage provides per computation
fairness, and (c) Mirage is able to gracefully deal with
compromised routers.
Hypothesis 1: Puzzle scheme security: For a computa-
tional puzzle with difficulty level d, the attacker has neg-
ligible advantage in obtaining active IP addresses compared
to honest sources.
Proof: We can model the AES block cipher as a
pseudorandom permutation. If the attacker has any advantage
over an honest source end host’s brute force strategy for
solving the computational puzzle, then the attacker would be
able to break the pseudorandom permutation as well. Thus,
the best strategy for the attackers is a brute force through
the 2d possible keys, which is identical to the honest client
strategy.
Hypothesis 2: Per computation fairness: Let CA and CH
denote the computational resources for the attacker and
honest sources respectively. The honest source end host’s
share of the victim bandwidth is CH
CH+CA
Proof: From Theorem 1, we know that the attacker’s
advantage over honest sources in solving the computational
puzzles is negligible. We have already shown that network
scanning attacks to uncover active IP addresses are ineffec-
tive. Also, from Section V-B, source end hosts fully utilize
their computational resources by continuing to solve compu-
tational puzzles even after obtaining a single active IP address
for the destination. Thus after any amount of time t, the
number of active IP addresses known by the attackers and the
honest clients are proportional to CA and CH respectively.
Finally, in our protocol, the network performs per destination
fair queuing, resulting in fair sharing of resources amongst
active IP addresses. Thus the honest source end hosts get
CH
CH+CA
of the total bandwidth.
Hypothesis 3: Impact of compromised routers: Let a set
of compromised routers carry a fraction f of the legitimate
traffic towards a destination end host under attack. If the set
of compromised routers collude with the adversary, then the
honest sources’ share of the victim bandwidth is CH ·(1−f)
CH+CA
of the total bandwidth.
Proof: In Mirage, malicious routers that handle a frac-
tion f of the legitimate traffic towards the destination end
host can snoop on the legitimate traffic towards the destina-
tion end host and uncover its active IP addresses. Moreover,
in addition to snooping on the legitimate traffic, the malicious
routers can drop the legitimate client traffic towards the
destination to increase the attacker’s bandwidth share. Thus
the attackers will be able to obtain a fraction CA+f ·CH
CA+CH
of
the total bandwidth, while the honest source end hosts obtain
a fraction CH ·(1−f)
CH+CA
of the total bandwidth. 6
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we quantify the attack resilience of Mirage
using a prototype implementation and an ns-2 simulation,
compare Mirage with other DoS defenses, and perform
Internet bandwidth measurements to determine the extent
to which Mirage must be deployed in order to provide
protection against various levels of DoS.
6We note that compromised routers in the destination’s upstream AS also
have the potential to reveal the access control list to the adversary, but the
upstream AS can easily detect and isolate such compromised routers by
inserting a few spurious entries in the ACL and checking for traffic towards
those destination IP addresses.
A. Prototype Implementation
To evaluate Mirage’s performance and deployability, we
built a prototype implementation of Mirage. We did not
attempt to optimize the prototype system; rather, our goal is
to verify the design and evaluate its deployability. To evaluate
our prototype, we constructed a Mirage-enabled web service,
which we call the victim server, and configured a set of
clients to access that web service.
Client side: We implemented the JavaScript program de-
scribed in § V-B to enable the client to “hop” addresses
without requiring changes to the client’s browser or operating
system. This JavaScript is located at the puzzle server as
shown in Figure 3(a). When the DNS directs a client to the
puzzle server, the client fetches and solves the puzzle by
running the JavaScript provided by the puzzle server. These
operations are transparent to the user; the user simply directs
its browser to the victim’s domain name.
Server side: The server-side components, comprised of the
victim server, router, DNS server, and puzzle server, provide
transparent protection for a victim server. By transparent,
we mean that the user of a client machine need not install
any additional software. We used BIND [11] to implement
the DNS server. We defined our own zone (miragev6.org)
and created a probing tool that regularly sends pings to the
victim server to detect when the victim server is under attack.
Initially, www.mirage v6.org resolves directly to the victim’s
IP address. Once the probing tool fails to receive a certain
number of echo responses, it changes the DNS record so that
www.miragev6.org resolves to the puzzle server’s IP address
(which, in our prototype, is the DNS server). We set the TTL
for the DNS record to a small value so that an entry cached
before the victim was under attack will be quickly corrected
after the attack. When the victim is under DoS attack and the
client tries to access www.miragev6.org, the client receives
the IP address of the puzzle server. The client connects to the
puzzle server and fetches JavaScript code which includes a
puzzle. Our implementation uses the scheme in § V-A, using
AES as the encryption algorithm.
Experimental setup: To investigate Mirage’s operation in
the wide-area, we conducted experiments in the Internet using
the PlanetLab testbed. Figure 3(b) shows how we set up the
network. We selected random (lightly CPU-loaded) nodes
to run our experiments. We selected one PlanetLab node to
act as the client, and one PlanetLab node to run the server,
router, puzzler server, and DNS software. Since PlanetLab
hosts do not directly provide IPv6 compatibility, for our
IPv6 experiments we used an IPv4 encapsulated tunnel. We
found that standard tunnel (e.g. GRE) packets are blocked
by firewalls of some PlanetLab networks, so we used UDP
tunnels for our experiments. We implemented this tunnel
with the TUN [45] virtual interface and Click [14]. In an
IPv6-enabled machine, outgoing IPv6 packets are delivered
to TUN device which lets Click capture the packets. Click
(a) Prototype implementation architecture.
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(b) Experimental setup.
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(c) Mirage guarantees normal users’ through-
put even with high-rate attackers.Fig. 3. Prototype implementation.
then encapsulates the packets with UDP tunnel. Because
PlanetLab nodes lack kernel support for IPv6, we assigned
IPv4 addresses to the TUN device and used Click to translate
between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
B. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate how well Mirage can defend
against possible attacks. We do not argue that we consider
all possible attacks; rather, our intention is to quantify Mi-
rage’s attack resilience. We consider two attacks: one that
exhausts network bandwidth and one that exhausts hopping
IP addresses.
Bandwidth exhaustion attack: By increasing its sending
rate, or the number of flows it sends, an attacker can
increase its traffic rate to overwhelm normal users’ traffic.
We examined the effect of the attack traffic rate on benign
traffic by setting up ten benign TCP traffic flows and one
UDP attack traffic flow that share a single bottleneck link to
the victim. We measured the throughput of the benign and the
attack traffic, and compared them with and without Mirage.
Figure 3(c) shows the results when we vary the attack traffic
rate between 0.5 to 1.3 times the bandwidth of the bottleneck
link. Without Mirage, as the attack traffic rate increases,
the normal user’s traffic rate decreases; with Mirage, fair
queueing drops the attackers’ excess packets rather than the
normal user’s traffic.
Hopping IP address exhaustion attack: Since Mirage uses
fair queueing per hopping IP address, an attacker can request
a large number of hopping IP addresses to prevent normal
users from getting hopping IP addresses, thus preventing
normal users from transmitting to the victim. In order to
evaluate Mirage’s performance under a large number of
attackers, we use the ns-2 simulator [37]. To parametrize
the simulation, we developed a computational model and
used Internet experiments using a small number of attacker
processes to estimate the parameters for our model.
Our Internet experiments used three machines to behave
as an attacker and one machine to behave as the normal
user. We implemented a client using C code to access the
Mirage-enabled web service. To demonstrate the performance
of our JavaScript extension, we also considered Firefox to
be the client. Both normal users and attackers solve puzzles
as quickly as possible in order to obtain hopping addresses;
however, in normal user machines, a client process generates
IP addresses, whereas on attacker machines, we vary the
number of client processes that are generating IP addresses.
In our prototype implementation, the puzzle server uses hop-
ping IP addresses released from a leaky bucket and assigns
it to the puzzle solution with the highest difficulty. A process
that is not chosen will increase its puzzle difficulty and try
again. Without Mirage, the puzzle server grants all requests
for IP addresses. We measured the number of hopping IP
addresses obtained by the attacker machines and the normal
user machine. Figure 4a shows the ratio of the number of
hopping IP addresses per attacker machine to the number
of hopping IP addresses of normal user machine when we
use Firefox as a client. Without Mirage, as the number of
attacker processes increases, the attacker machines can get a
larger number of hopping IP addresses, which corresponds
to a large number of victim machine accesses. Note that
for Firefox processes, the growth rate becomes smaller as
the number of processes increases because the additional
processes will saturate the machine’s computational power.
We can see that with C code, the saturation of computation
power is reduced. With Mirage, this computational limit is
reached much more quickly, because a node’s ability to get
IP addresses is computationally limited.
We used this experimental data to establish a model in
ns-2. We used a dumbbell topology with RTT equal to
that from our experimental study. When a node solves a
puzzle solution, it takes an amount of time to generate a
solution given by B+N×E
C
where B is the cost (in cycles)
of running a client process without puzzle calculations, N
represents the number of encryption attempts needed to solve
a puzzle, which we model as a normal distribution, E is
the number of cycles taken by each encryption attempt, and
C is the speed of the CPU. Without Mirage, a node takes
time B/C to resolve the victim’s IP address. We varied
the values of B, N , and E to find parameters that best
matched our experimental study; that is, ones that minimized
the variance between experimental and simulation results.
Figure 4a shows how well the two sets of data match. With
these simulation parameters, we performed simulation studies
to show how the number of attacker processes affects the
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Fig. 4. Defense against hopping IP address exhaustion attack.
number of hopping IP addresses that the attacker machine
obtained. Figures 4b and 4c show the results when the
number of attacking machines is 3 and 30, respectively. We
vary the number of attacker processes from 3 to 30000. In all
cases, we can see that with Mirage, an attacker cannot obtain
as many hopping IP addresses as in the case without Mirage.
Note that the attacker performance dips beyond a threshold
number of attacker processes due to resource constraints at
the attacker machines.
C. Comparative Study
We compare the effectiveness of different DoS defense
mechanisms: Phalanx [17], TVA [53] and Mirage, using the
ns-2 simulator. For Phalanx, we developed ns-2 code and for
TVA, we used the code developed by authors of TVA [53].
For Mirage, we used DRR as our fair queueing mechanism.
We followed the methodology in the work of Liu et al. [32].
We used the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset [26] to
derive the AS-level topology, which has links annotated with
round trip times at each hop. We scaled down the AS-
level topology by 1/200 since the memory of our simulation
machine does not support the full Internet-scale AS-topology.
In our simulated environment, ten legitimate TCP senders try
to send 50 files each, of size 2KB. Each sender immediately
starts sending a file after its previous file transfer is done.
We measured the fraction of successful file transfers and
the average time to deliver files. While legitimate senders
send TCP traffic, attackers send UDP traffic. All legitimate
and attacker traffic goes through the same bottleneck link
to a destination. For the first simulation, we intended 10K
attackers in the Internet-scale. Hence in our simulation scaled
down, the number of simulated attackers is 50, and each
attacker sends 10Kbps of UDP traffic. Figure 5 shows results
when we vary the bottleneck link bandwidth from 300Kbps to
520Kbps. For the second simulation, we vary the number of
attackers from 5 to 500 fixing the bottleneck link bandwidth
as 500Kbps. Figure 6 shows the results in this case. Overall,
we find that Mirage achieves its deployment benefits while
providing comparable results to Phalanx and TVA across a
variety of attack strengths.
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Fig. 5. Comparative study varying link bandwidth
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D. Bottleneck Measurements on PlanetLab
The goal of this study is to compute the pushback links:
the nearest links to the victim server that are sufficient
to block the attacker’s traffic while still letting non-attack
traffic through. Computing these links sheds light on how
close to the network edge (router hops/AS hops) Mirage
can be deployed while still realizing its benefits. To gain
information about link bandwidths in today’s Internet, we
ran pchar, an open-source reimplementation of pathchar,
from 336 randomly-selected PlanetLab nodes to the top 100
websites from alexa.com. We constructed a target IP address
set by selecting a single IP address per nslookup query (the
first IP address). We ran pchar using 32 repetitions per hop,
and testing each hop with 300 byte increments. We ignored
route changes during the course of a pchar experiment, by
setting the -c flag. To improve accuracy of pchar data, we
also ran the pathneck [25] bandwidth probing tool over
the same set of links. Unlike pchar, pathneck measures the
available bandwidth rather than the capacity of links. Any
capacity estimate lower than the available bandwidth estimate
was considered an error. In addition, we combined multiple
experiments for improved accuracy. For the links closer to
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Fig. 7. Running Mirage at only the server’s local network and ISP provider (first AS-level hop) is sufficient to achieve most of Mirage’s benefits.
the target hop, we may have several pchar estimates from
different PlanetLab nodes. In this case, we can improve
accuracy by considering the median value of the estimates to
be the final estimate of the link capacity (and thus mitigate
the effect of outliers). If all pchar estimates for a link were
erroneous, then for our analysis, we assume that such hops
are not the bottlenecks for the DDoS attack.
Data analysis methodology: For our analysis, we assume
that the distribution of malicious nodes in the network (bot
nodes) is similar to the distribution of PlanetLab nodes
selected for our experiments. While our assumption is only
a heuristic, our methodology is one way to shed light on the
problem (without actually carrying out a DDoS attack). For
each target IP, we first combine the results of all PlanetLab
experiments, and merge them into a single network map,
rooted at the target IP. We annotate links in the map with
the fraction of paths traversing that link, and the median of
the capacity estimates. Since we assume that the distribution
of PlanetLab nodes is similar to the distribution of malicious
nodes, we first approximate the amount of attack traffic
traversing each link, for particular attack throughput values.
For example, if the total attack throughput is 1Gbps, and 10%
of the PlanetLab paths (probes from PlanetLab nodes to the
victim server) traverse that link, then the amount of attack
traffic traversing that link is 0.1 ∗ 1Gbps = 100Mbps. Using
the bandwidth annotated network map, it is now possible
to compute the set of optimal pushback links. Finally we
compute the weighted mean of the router level hop counts
for the set of pushback links, where the weight indicates the
fraction of attack traffic traversing that router. In addition
to computing router-level hops for the bottleneck points, we
also consider AS-level hops. For this purpose, we compute
the IP to AS mapping using a BGP RIB snapshot collected
from Routeviews [40]. Our study does not account for the
scenarios where an AS has multiple AS numbers or when
prefixes within a single AS number have multiple owners.
Experimental Results: Figure 7 depicts the distance to
pushback links as a function of the attack traffic using a
boxplot, both in terms of the router and AS hop counts.
When the attack traffic is less than 2 Gbps (vast majority
of real world attacks in 2011 [30]), the median distance to
the pushback links is less than 2 router hops and 1 AS hop.
Thus running Mirage at only the victim’s local network and
ISP provider is sufficient to achieve Mirage’s benefits in this
scenario. Even when the attack throughput is 10 Gbps, the
median distance to the pushback links is only 4 router hops
and 2 AS hops.
VIII. DEPLOYMENT
Like previous DDoS mitigation schemes, our design re-
quires changes to certain components within the network.
However, our work differs from “clean slate” approaches
which require large-scale changes to the Internet infrastruc-
ture to achieve their benefits. In particular, our experimental
results show that only the victim server’s local network and
its upstream ISP can deploy Mirage to defend against moder-
ate scale attacks. Moreover, Mirage is incentive compatible.
Since the victim has a business relationship with its upstream
ISP, this may spur economic benefits for adoption [19].
Incrementally deploying Mirage at ISPs that are further
upstream increases Mirage’s resilience against attack. Mirage
requires the following modifications to existing systems:
ADNS: Mirage requires changes to the server’s authoritative
DNS server, to redirect clients to the puzzle server, which can
be hosted by existing services such as Akamai or Amazon
S3. Since the authoritative DNS server is typically owned
and operated by the service provider, many deployed systems
(e.g., Akamai) leverage the ADNS as an easy-to-modify
location to instrument their designs.
Server: Mirage can be deployed as a bump in the wire
solution at the server; existing software does not need to be
modified. For example, Mirage software can simply bind the
server’s hopping IP addresses to 0.0.0.0. Alternately, Mirage
can also be deployed as a reverse proxy.
Server’s upstream network(s): Mirage also requires
changes to networks. However, Mirage does not require
widespread adoption in order for servers to benefit. Changes
to network infrastructure that is under direct influence of the
service provider, such as its own network, and ISPs that it
directly pays for service, suffice to defend against moderate
scale attacks. In addition, these network changes do not
rely on router vendors to incorporate new changes into their
software, and can instead be realized through configuration
changes. However, depending on the point of deployment,
Mechanism Mirage NetFence [33] TVA [53] Portcullis [38] Phalanx [17]
Filtering IP dest based Capability based Capability based Capability based Capability based
Router communication Out of band New header New header New header New header
Fair queuing/rate limiting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puzzle distribution Yes No No (attack [38]) Yes Yes
Bandwidth-based fairness No No No No Yes
Router Cryptography No Yes Yes Yes No
Other None Passport Path identifiers None Traffic forwarding via
overlay network
TABLE I
IN-NETWORK SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR DDOS DEFENSE SCHEMES.
Deployment details Mirage NetFence [33] TVA [53] Portcullis [38] Phalanx [17]
Source upgrades Optional Required Required Required Optional
Destination upgrades Required Required Required Required Required
Bottleneck router(s) upgrades Required Required Required Required Required
Other router(s) upgrades None Yes Yes None Yes (Overlay member)
Puzzle distribution Akamai/DNS None None (attack) Akamai/DNS Akamai/DNS
Router upgrade type Configuration
changes (may need
more memory)
Software and
hardware changes
(by vendors)
Software and
hardware changes
(by vendors)
Software and
hardware changes
(by vendors)
Software and hardware
changes (by vendors)
Other None None None Trusted authority Overlay network
TABLE II
AFFECTED DEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS FOR DDOS DEFENSE SCHEMES.
the ACL mechanism may need to be scaled (which can
be done by the operator by installing more memory, rather
than needing to convince the vendor to change the router’s
hardware/software design. These configuration changes can
be automated through the use of an IRSCP [46] to install
ACLs within the network. Mirage can alternatively leverage
OpenFlow, with Mirage’s functionality implemented within
the NOX controller. Several large ISPs have already begun
offering commercial services to allow customers to install
prefixes for blacklist filtering [16].
A. Comparison with other approaches
Next, we contrast the deployment challenges of Mirage
with previous proposals, in terms of what changes need to
be made to the infrastructure (network primitives), and which
players in the network need to instrument those changes
(administrative boundaries).
Adding new primitives to the network: Deploying new
functionality in the network becomes easier when the changes
to existing devices are small. Protocols that require new
primitives in routers require coordination with (and across)
network vendors to be realized. Table I shows the type
of changes required to network devices to deploy several
recently-proposed DDoS mitigation schemes. First, Net-
Fence, TVA, Portcullis, and Phalanx perform filtering based
on some form of a capability. This requires modifications to
the software of Internet routers to process and modify this
capability. In contrast, Mirage performs filtering based on
the destination IP address, and communicates ACL entries to
routers using legacy protocols (iBGP feeds or configuration
changes via sessions to an IRSCP). Next, Mirage, Portcullis,
and Phalanx require computational puzzles (proof of work) in
order to defend against attacks targeting the request channels.
TVA does not use computational puzzles, but this makes it
vulnerable to the Denial of Capability (DoC) attack [38].
NetFence requires defenses to prevent the IP spoofing at-
tack (such as Passport) to be widely deployed in order to
secure the request channel. In addition to computation-based
fairness using computational puzzles, Phalanx also implicitly
adopts bandwidth-based fairness [48], an approach which is
known to induce congestion collapse in the network. Finally,
the non-Mirage mechanisms require additional functionality
from the network, such as 1) cryptography at the routers for
NetFence, TVA, and Portcullis, 2) insertion of path identifiers
for TVA, and 3) overlay network to forward traffic for
Phalanx.
Deploying changes across administrative boundaries: De-
ploying new functionality in the network becomes easier
when fewer participants have to cooperate in deploying those
changes. Protocols that require clients to install new software,
or require widespread upgrades to routers can complicate
deployment. Table II describes the location where changes
would need to be realized within the network. First, only
Mirage and Phalanx do not require source hosts to upgrade.
Second, all mechanisms require destinations to upgrade, and
also require deployment at the bottleneck routers (points
of congestion). However, TVA and NetFence also require
other routers to upgrade, for inserting path identifiers and
for defending against IP spoofing; this means that it is
not possible for an ISP to unilaterally deploy NetFence.
Similarly, Phalanx also requires either an external overlay
network to absorb the DDoS attack, or requires additional
routers to upgrade and participate in the overlay scheme.
Portcullis requires all Internet routers to trust a single entity.
Finally, Mirage, Portcullis, and Phalanx require an additional
deployment component to distribute puzzles. However, we
note that puzzle distribution in Mirage, Portcullis and Phalanx
does not require global cooperation from ISPs. A Victim
Fig. 8. Hourly DDoS attack cost as a function of desired share of victim’s
capacity. Mirage raises the attack cost by several orders of magnitude.
end host can easily use existing CDNs like Akamai, which
can be given financial incentives to participate. Finally, we
note that Mirage is the only scheme in which functionality
required from the routers is already deployed in today’s
routers, though this functionality (ACLs) may need to be
scaled depending on the point of deployment. Routers already
have support for ACLs and fair queuing, which can be
enabled with relatively straightforward configuration com-
mands. Scaling memory requirements for ACLs can be done
by the operator by installing more memory at the router,
rather than requiring router vendor’s cooperation.
IX. DISCUSSION
Here, we discuss some ramifications of our design.
A. Applicability to non-web applications
Mirage is ideally suited to defend against web applications,
since its JavaScript mechanism obviates the need for client
software. However, Mirage can also be used to defend against
non-web applications, at the cost of upgrading clients. The
JavaScript mechanism can be replaced by client software that
provides equivalent functionality of fetching/solving puzzles.
We note that even in this setting, Mirage provides stronger
deployment properties compared with previous work, since
it provides security benefits when only the victim’s upstream
ISP cooperates (as illustrated in Table II).
B. Cost analysis using EC2 pricing
Next, we perform a cost analysis of launching a DDoS
attack by considering (a) Amazon EC2 prices for compu-
tation and data transfer [1], and (b) a data center environ-
ment which serves hundreds of thousands of users in short
time periods [15] as the victim server. Let us suppose that
the victim has a 1 Gbps link to its service provider, and
that the computational capability of each honest user is 1
EC2 compute unit (equivalent to 1.0-1.2 GHz 2007 Xeon
processor). Without Mirage, the cost of obtaining a fraction
x of the victim’s network capacity is proportional only to
the required EC2 data transfer. With Mirage, the attacker
is forced to spend extra resources for solving computational
puzzles. Figure 8 depicts the hourly cost of launching a DDoS
attack in US dollars, as a function of the attacker’s desired
share of the victim’s network capacity. We can see that
Mirage raises the attack cost by several orders of magnitude.
In future work, we will extend this analysis by considering
botnet rent prices for computation and bandwidth.
C. Adaptive network defense
To improve performance under small and moderate sized
attacks, we describe an adaptive mechanism that utilizes
network support in proportion to the strength of the attack.
In particular, we organize the active set of IP addresses as a
binary tree, with nodes in the tree representing IP addresses,
and the number of leaves equaling the number of potential
clients. Levels in the tree represent priorities: IP addresses
at level i are assigned half the priority as compared to IP
addresses at level i+1. We modify our puzzle server to return
multiple IP addresses, one from each level in the tree. Source
end hosts first try the IP address corresponding to the root of
the tree (level 0), and if they are unable to get good service,
they adaptively switch to the next level in the binary tree. This
has the advantage that the router only needs to maintain per
aggregate state in the access control lists while performing
fair queuing. Similarly, the ACL entries could also be added
adaptively by the destination end host - it starts off by adding
the root of the tree, and then progressively adding next level
IP addresses as needed. This reduces the ACL list size.
D. Authorized users and classful services
We can extend our architecture to enable destination end
hosts to provide higher priority to authorized users. Firstly,
victim servers could communicate private IP addresses to
authorized users using out-of-band communications. Sec-
ondly, authorized users could use Mirage to authenticate to
the victim server and receive private IP addresses, or hints
to solve computational puzzles. Finally, authorized users
could authenticate themselves to the puzzle servers, using
a server-supplied cookie (possibly cached from last visit
by the browser). The authentication could be performed in
zero knowledge, with no information about client credentials
being revealed to the puzzle server. Upon authentication, the
puzzle server could provide either private IP addresses or
hints for puzzle to the authorized users.
We note that our architecture can enable a useful scenario
where a sensitive server’s IP address is visible only to
authorized users. Here, the server would need to supply the
cookie to authorized users via an out of band channel, and
the puzzle server would respond only after authentication.
The server’s IP address is practically invisible to the rest of
the Internet, and is thus largely immune to threats like bot
infections due to random IP scanning.
E. Insider collusion attacks
A potential concern in Mirage is the collusion between
a compromised end host in the victim network and the
attacker. Suppose that the victim network has two nodes. The
compromised end host could install an ACL at the upstream
AS with k entries, with the attackers having full knowledge
of the active IP addresses for the compromised host. The
attackers could then send traffic to the k IP addresses listed in
the ACL. Due to per destination fair queueing at the upstream
routers, the attackers would gain an overwhelming share of
the traffic at the victim link and DoS the honest end host. In
practice, the operator can deal with this through appropriate
network management. One management policy to solve the
problem could be to bound the size of the ACL per victim.
F. Prefix/path/location hopping
While our design focuses on hopping of IP addresses, it
may be possible to apply this technique to other components
of network protocols. For example, it may be possible to
perform prefix hopping, by having router prefixes changing
with time, path hopping, by changing the set of Internet
paths used to route to a destination, and location hopping,
by leveraging virtual machine migration techniques to relo-
cate services on-demand in the presence of a DoS attack.
These techniques may assist in providing improved security
properties in present and future Internet architectures.
X. CONCLUSION
Mirage uses an analog of frequency hopping from wireless
networks: hosts vary their IP address through a pseudoran-
dom sequence to evade attacks by unauthorized hosts. From
theoretical analysis, simulations, and experiments from a pro-
totype implementation, we find that Mirage achieves compa-
rable performance to previous DDoS mitigation mechanisms.
However, Mirage has improved deployment properties over
previous designs. Mirage does not require an external overlay
network, or a trusted Internet authority, or defenses against IP
spoofing. In particular, Mirage is incrementally deployable;
a victim server and its upstream ISP can deploy Mirage
and defend against moderate scale attacks, without requiring
source end hosts to install any software.
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